28 April 2003

Death is All in a Day's Work

ALANG/ MUMBAI — The Shipbreaking yards at Alang have become synonymous with death, disease and despair, says G. Ananthapadmanabhan, Executive Director, Greenpeace India.

Seven people are dead, six others are injured, and more than 10 people are 'missing' as another shipbreaking explosion rocks Alang on the 19th of May. But as Greenpeace has been reiterating for the past many years, death should be no surprise at Alang. The abysmal working conditions, the high levels of toxicity, the blatant violation of all rules and regulations have combined to make the workers of ship-breaking yards one of the most vulnerable communities - so much so that death is almost casually treated as another 'occupational hazard.'

The most recent explosion in yard no 5 of Arya Shipbreaking yard on 19th of May involved the ship INVALLE, an oil tanker originally from Belgium. What is more noteworthy, is that this is the fourth major accident in the last two and a half months. Each of these accidents leaves behind several dead, and many others so severely maimed and disfigured that even veteran war-photographers would cringe to see their gory images.

The explosion on the INVALLE was a typical example of shipbreaking accidents, yet particularly ironical. The accident occurred when workers were trying to cut a pipe in the erstwhile engine room. According to one source, this basement-level engine room had one big tank full of oil that caught fire, generating gaseous fumes that resulted in the explosion. This accident proves that the INVALLE (like so many other ships brought to Alang) was not delivered in "Gas free for hot works" condition - even though that is mandatory according to the regulations of the Gujarat Maritime Board (GMB). But even though the ship-owners recover millions of dollars in selling their decrepit vessels to breakers' yards, they do not invest the little amount of money it would take to make their ships "Gas free for hot work".

As with every accident in Alang, the next-of-kin of the dead place the blame on the ship-owners and on the GMB. The GMB seems to have inadequate regulatory systems to monitor the lack of safety procedures in place at the yards. The ship-owners pay no attention to removal of toxic waste from the ships, and transfer their responsibilities to Shipbreaking countries.

Although discussion of the liability for decontaminating ships before sending them to the yards has been going on for several years, this year, according to Greenpeace, will be "crucial". There is commitment at the IMO to have guidelines on ship recycling adopted by the end of this year. Greenpeace will urge the IMO to go for mandatory rules on ships for scrap and oblige owners to clean their ships before exporting them, and ensure that tanks are delivered gas-free for hot work. Until the time that ship owners are held legally responsible for their end-of-life vessels, hazardous old ships will continue to go to the countries where regulation of environmental laws is at its weakest.

Greenpeace would like to see binding international legislation that will force the shipping industry to deal with hazardous waste in ships. But the proposed moratorium on exporting ships for scrap has seen setbacks - especially with the United States plan to back out of it.

Towards the end of last year, Greenpeace, BAN, Toxics Link, the National Alliance of People's Movement (NAPM), the All India Trade Union Congress (CITU AITUC, Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) and the Indian Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) wrote to the Consul of the US in New Delhi, making plain their views about the Bush administration's plan to break out of the moratorium on exporting ships for scrap.

In the letter the organizations said: "We would like to bring to your attention the implications of recent deliberations in the US to dispose of more than 300 ships without decontamination in… Asian shipbreaking yards."

"You may recall that the then US vice president Al Gore placed a moratorium on the sale of US government-owned ships for scrap… after Indian trade unions and environmental organisations protested outside the US embassy in New Delhi in January 1998."

"While we are in no way opposed to the reclamation of steel for reuse… we have repeatedly indicated our opposition to the export to any country… of any form of hazardous waste. Ships for scrap, unless decontaminated, are hazardous waste by virtue of the fact that most, if not all, ships contain a range of hazardous material in their structure."

“Various legal precedents exist to confirm that ships for scrap (unless decontaminated) should be treated as hazardous wastes," said the letter. "Furthermore," it claimed, "such an export is illegal under… international law and would, if exported to India, violate the May 5, 1997, Supreme Court ruling prohibiting the import of hazardous wastes."

"The ships in question are too old… to travel on their own steam. They would need to be towed to the shipbreaking yard. There is no reason why the ships cannot be decontaminated prior to towing to the shipbreaking yard," concluded the authors of the letter.

The astonishing regularity with which fatal accidents occur in Alang, clearly indicate that a strong and mandatory framework must be set up by the IMO to make sure that the same rules apply to every ship for scrap.

Greenpeace is demanding:

1. That all ships brought to the Asian shipbreaking yards be thoroughly decontaminated and be made gas- free for hot works and man entry before arrival.

2. That the International Maritime Organisation develops a strong and mandatory framework to make sure that the same rule apply to all ships and that shipowners are held accountable and liable for their End of Life Vessels and for any hazardous materials they contain.

3. That the Basel Convention be strictly adhered to, and transboundary movement and disposal of hazardous wastes be regulated as per international law.

Source: GreenPeace, Press release – 28 April 2003

23 January 2002

Basle Convention Embraces "MAKER to BREAKER" Ethos in Scrap Guidelines:


GENEVA, Switzerland - THE Basle Convention's new technical guidelines for clean ship scrapping will be further refined to reflect the importance of related work being carried out by the International Maritime Organisation and the International Labour Organisation, writes Brian Reyes.

The decision, taken at a meeting of the convention's technical working group, reflects the need to achieve a co-ordinated and global approach to properly tackle the industry's well-documented problems.

"The meeting reiterated how important the work of IMO and ILO is to address the issue worldwide in a comprehensive manner," said Pierre Portas, technical director at the convention's Geneva secretariat.

He said there would be no substantial changes to the guidelines, which will provide a common foundation which governments can apply to ships destined for scrap and will likely be adopted at the working group's next meeting in May.

The guidelines call for a review of ship design and construction, promoting the idea that green scrapping starts when the vessel is being built.

The "maker to breaker" concept was highlighted by IMO secretary general William O'Neil during an interview published on the website of Norwegian classification society Det Norske Veritas (DNV).

"A ship's death should be prepared for, even before its birth," Mr O&'Neil said.

"The ship's design and construction must take into account how dismantling and recycling can be carried out."

Operational decisions must also take into account this long-term perspective, he added.

The IMO has now set up a working group to look at the issue of ship recycling, which will figure prominently on the agenda for the next meeting of the Marine Environment Protection Committee in March.

But the organisation makes clear that its responsibility and authority ends on the beaches, that it has no remit to address issues of worker safety of yard environments.

"The IMO cannot and should not be involved in these," Mr O'Neil told DNV. [con’d. p. 2] The problem of regulatory jurisdiction is the main reason why group's such as the Basle Convention are trying to pull together the various initiatives under way.

Paul Bailey, industrial specialist at the ILO, said the organisation was working on its own set of guidelines related to conditions for workers on shore.

The ILO has conducted extensive, on-the-ground research at yards in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and China.

It is now seeking funding for a technical co-operation project which focuses on three-year strategies to working conditions in shipbreaking yards.

Source: ban.org. By Brian Reyes, LLoyds List. 23 January 2002

10 January 2002

Shipbreaking and the Legal Obligations under the Basel Convention:


Findings/Conclusions:

1. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (“Basel Convention”) applies to the transboundary movement of ships destined for final disposal or recycling when they contain hazardous materials defined as hazardous wastes in the Convention. As such, the Convention imposes substantive obligations on all the Parties often irrespective of the Party’s status, to prevent the movement and disposal of these ships-as-hazardous-waste in contravention of the Convention.

2. A ship destined for shipbreaking is an obvious example of the kind of situation for which the objectives of the Basel Convention apply. The primary purpose of the Convention is to ensure Parties take responsibility for their own hazardous waste, establish hazardous waste disposal facilities (including recycling) within their country, minimize the generation and transboundary movement of hazardous waste, and ensure that they do not export the hazards, and damage to human health and the environment, to other countries. In most cases, ships exported for shipbreaking are a clear and convincing violation of these objectives. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Parties to ensure that all ship sales are scrutinized to ensure that no attempted circumvention of the Convention exists.

3. The Basel Convention in its scope and obligations are not confined to prior-informed consent, but go far beyond this mechanical paperwork regime. We therefore disagree with the submission of Prof. Geir Ulfstein’s (“Prof. Ulfstein”) in its conclusion that port states have no jurisdiction over vessels destined for scrapping with regard to scrapping in other states; or that flag states are not responsible for the activities of their vessels. Indeed it is clear that many of the Basel obligations will apply to Parties holding jurisdiction over owners, brokers, captains, crew, etc.

4. We agree with the Canadian Government’s submission (“Canada”) in its conclusion that there is no need for the Basel Legal Group to propose the adoption of a new legal instrument to cover issues adequately and appropriately addressed by the Basel Convention. Rather what is needed is the adoption of a Guideline or Decision to clarify the effect of the Basel Convention to ships. An example of needed clarification involves better defining at what point a ship will be deemed a waste and how that will be determined.

5. Similarly, much ambiguity will be overcome, and harmony with the OECD regime attained, if mirror listings in Annex VIII and IX of the Basel Convention with respect to ships-as-hazardous wastes, are added by amendment to those Annexes.

6. Pursuant to the substantive obligations of the Basel Convention, the Basel Ban has clear relevance to the issue of shipbreaking, and the importance of the Basel Ban is likewise certain. According to Decision III/1, all Annex VII countries, regardless of their status, e.g. State of Export, port state, etc., have obligations to take legal actions to prevent hazardous wastes, such as ships destined for disposal or recycling, from being exported and disposed (including recycling) in non-Annex VII countries.
7. We support any efforts to pursue open discussion to reach a common understanding on the interpretation of the Basel Convention on the issue of shipbreaking and a pragmatic approach that will ensure proper implementation.

I. Ships as Hazardous Waste: Within the Scope of Basel Convention

1. We concur with Canada in their review of Prof. Ulfstein’s paper “that the Basel Convention applies to wastes that are disposed of, are required to be disposed of or are intended to be disposed of, including ships.”

2. We also concur with Canada that in ascertaining the meaning of the phrase “intended to be disposed of” simply involves an interpretation of the Basel Convention’s definition of waste to specific known facts. This can be established in many ways, a contract, for example, can be evidence of intent to dispose. Additionally, acts, such as facsimile, phone call, telex or electronic mail, which show an intention to dispose, are also sufficient evidence of such intent. Preparatory actions such as cancellation or modification of insurance, a notice of destination to a port or notices given to crew can all evidence intent to dispose.

3. If the owners intend to dispose of a ship-as-hazardous-waste prior to its arrival at the shipbreaking state, then the Basel Convention’s obligations cannot be frustrated by simply signing an agreement, e.g. sale, charter, etc. that disguises intent to dispose, or that avoids establishing such intent prior to export by avoiding signing a written agreement.

However, illegal as this might be, it is far too easy to hide or obscure “intent to dispose”. For example, a ship owner may simply not announce such intent until the ship in question is in the shipbreaking state, thereby avoiding the “waste” definition, the transboundary movement and eventually, most of the obligations of the Basel Convention. In this scenario the vessel’s crew and others usually are well aware of the fate of the ship destined for breaking or disposal. Cases that fit this potential circumvention scenario could be uncovered but would need to be scrutinized by the relevant authorities to do so.

Thus, in our view the greatest obstacle to easily applying the Basel Convention to ships-as-hazardous-waste lies with the question of hiding “intent-to-dispose”. It is therefore strongly suggested that a solution such as that proposed by the European Commission (see Annex B) be seriously explored and established as part of a Guideline or Decision elaborating and clarifying this issue among Parties.

4. We agree with Prof. Ulfstein’s assumption that the vessel itself should be considered “hazardous waste” under Art. 1(1) of the Basel Convention, and not only the individual hazardous substance that forms part of or that exists on board a vessel.

5. Similarly, we support Canada’s opinion that a vessel or other floating structure that contains hazardous components be controlled as an amber waste under the OECD control system.

To eliminate any ambiguity in the Basel Convention, regarding hazardous waste definitions, we propose amending Annexes VIII and IX with mirror listings similar in terminology to the current OECD listing.

Add to Annex VIII of the Basel Convention:

“Vessels and other floating structures for breaking up, not properly emptied or decontaminated of any material considered as hazardous waste under the Convention.”

Add to Annex IX of the Basel Convention:

“Vessels and other floating structures for breaking up, properly emptied or decontaminated of any material considered as hazardous waste under the Convention.”

6. We agree with Prof. Ulfstein that full abandonment is disposal under Annex IV of the Basel Convention. Disposal such as scuttling is, of course, disposal according to Annex IV (D1, D6).

II. Obligations under the Basel Convention

1. Article 6 Procedural Obligations
Clearly if an State of Export has been established then it will need to comply with Article 6 and its “prior informed consent” (PIC) regime.

2. Overarching Substantive Obligations – Art. 4

Although Prof. Ulfstein provides a detailed elaboration of the procedural obligation of the State Parties under Art. 6 (1), it is important to note that the Basel Convention imposes several overarching substantive obligations that empower Parties to act upon the shipbreaking issue, aside from the mechanics of the PIC procedures outlined in Art. 6. The biggest error in Prof. Ulfstein’s paper is that he ignores the clear Basel obligations on Parties outside of the Article 6 PIC regime:

a) The Basel Convention obligates the Parties, irrespective of their status (e.g. State of Export, Import, Transit, flag or port state), to prohibit or not permit the export of hazardous and other wastes to Parties, which have prohibited the import of such wastes (Art. 4(1)(b)).

b) The Basel Convention obligates the Parties, irrespective of their status, to prohibit or not permit such export where the State of Import does not consent in writing to the specific import (Art. 4 (1)(c)).

c) Another overarching Basel obligation requires that Parties must ensure that the transboundary movement of hazardous waste and other wastes is reduced to the minimum consistent with the environmentally sound and efficient management of such wastes, and is conducted in a manner which will protect human health and the environment against the adverse effects which may result from such movement (Art. 4 (2)(d)).

d) A Party, again irrespective of its status, is obligated not to allow the export of hazardous or other wastes if the Party has reason to believe that the wastes in question will not be managed in an environmentally sound manner (Art. 4(2)(e)).

The Basel definition of “environmentally sound management” (ESM) is “taking all practicable steps to ensure that hazardous wastes or other wastes are managed in a manner which will protect human health and the environment against the adverse effects which may result from such wastes.” (Art. 2(8)) (Emphasis added)

It must be noted that most shipbreaking operations around the world at this time do not meet this criterion. Ships destined for shipbreaking contain significant quantities of asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), hydraulic fluids, paints containing lead and/or other heavy metals, tributyltin or TBT antifouling coatings, contaminated holding tanks, and other substances rendering them hazardous waste and extremely dangerous to human health and the environment when scrapped in existing shipbreaking yards. Most of the shipbreaking is taking place in Asia, e.g., India, where the conditions are documented to be exceptionally dangerous and damaging to the health of the workers, surrounding community, and the environment.

e) Each Party, regardless of status, also has a legal obligation to prohibit illegal ship movements and must do so with respect to all persons, including corporations subject to its jurisdiction, including owners, charterers, brokers, shipping agents, and captains and crew, since under Art. 4(4), each Party must take appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including measures to prevent and punish conduct in contravention of the Convention. This is a crucial provision too often overlooked.

f) Moreover, the Convention allows each Party to take further action against hazardous wastes, as the Convention does not prevent any Party from imposing additional requirements beyond what is mentioned in the Convention, provided that any additional requirements are consistent with the provisions of the Convention, and is in accordance with the rules of international law, in order better to protect human health and the environment (Art. 4(11)).

g) The requirements of implementation and enforcement under Art. 4(4), and enhanced under Art. 4(11) recognize the Convention’s respect for a Party’s sovereignty, as these provisions require national legislation and national legal actions to operationalize their requirements. At the same time both articles unequivocally establish that Parties must proactively implement the Convention and that other appropriate measures of enforcement of the Basel Convention obligations are available to the Parties.

3. Port State / Flag State Jurisdiction and Navigational Rights

We, like Canada, strongly dispute Prof. Ulfstein’s conclusion that port states would have no jurisdiction over foreign flag vessels to protect the environment, in light of the above provisions. Prof. Ulfstein’s conclusion is based on an inappropriate extension of the “flag doctrine” to the exclusion of other applicable provisions such as Articles 4(7)(a) which applies to “all persons under its national jurisdiction”, and Articles 4(4) and 4(11).

Furthermore, it is well established that a state has jurisdiction over its territorial waters with respect to the preservation of the environment, prevention, reduction, and control of pollution, and protection of human health. The exception cited by Prof. Ulfstein in Article 4(12), relating to navigational rights and freedom of States, applies to navigation and will not oust jurisdiction while the ship is in port. An appropriate example of port state jurisdiction referred to above, is Article 23 of the 1995 Straddling Stocks Convention, which provides that a port state has the right and the duty to take measures, in accordance with international law, to promote the effectiveness of sub-regional, regional and global conservation and management measures.

A port state may inspect documents, fishing gear and catch on board fishing vessels, when such vessels are voluntarily in its ports or at its offshore terminals and States may adopt regulations empowering the relevant national authorities to prohibit landings and transshipments where it has been established that the catch has been taken in a manner which undermines the effectiveness of sub-regional, regional or global conservation and management measures on the high seas.

Also, note that Art. 4(12) first acknowledges the sovereignty of State Parties over their territorial sea. Sole emphasis on the navigational rights and freedoms of ships without considering the sovereignty of State Parties in the interpretation of Art. 4(12) will inevitably result in an imbalanced perspective. Thus, navigational rights and freedom can be tempered by State actions to protect and preserve the environment. A contrary interpretation of Art. 4(12) would completely undermine all control measures found in the Basel Convention, as the Basel Convention is clearly designed to control certain navigation that is in contravention of the Convention.

The tentative suggestion by Prof. Ulfstein citing restrictions on the port state’s jurisdiction based on the “temporary presence of foreign ships in ports” is irrelevant. There is nothing to prevent a port state, in the exercise of its sovereignty and in the observance of its obligation under the Basel Convention, from requiring such consent - such a requirement is applicable to the vessel while it is in port. It need not extend to the ship after the ship has left its territory, which is the issue Churchill and Lowe are addressing in their rather tentative suggestion. Port state jurisdiction is widely recognized in the law of the sea context, for instance in the 1995 Straddling Stocks Convention. Just as States Party to that Convention recognize port state jurisdiction, Professor Ulfstein is absolutely correct in observing that States Party to the Basel Convention have consented to restrictions imposed under the Basel Convention.
We also take issue with Prof. Ulfstein’s conclusion that flag states have no obligation under the Basel Convention to ensure the existence of consent from the Importing State. Article 4(7)(a) binds flag states that are Parties to the Basel Convention. Furthermore, Article 94(1) of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requires that every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag. Article 94(2)(b) of the UNCLOS also requires that States shall assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying its flag and its master, officers and crew in respect of administrative, technical and social matters concerning the ship.
In sum, port states have jurisdiction over foreign vessels under the Basel Convention to require that the consent be obtained from the state where the vessel will be disposed of, and other obligations under the Convention such as ascertaining that ship-as-hazardous-waste will be destined to environmentally sound management etc., and such jurisdiction is recognized in international law.
2. Party Obligation under the Basel Ban Amendment (Decision III/1)
The Basel Ban obligation states that all Annex VII Parties have a special obligation to “prohibit all transboundary movements of hazardous wastes which are destined for operations according to Annex IV A to States not listed in Annex VII.”

Note that the obligation is not solely that of the Annex VII State of Export, but would also include Annex VII port states, flag states, transit states, etc. as having an obligation to uphold the prohibition. Thus, Annex VII port states must prohibit the departure of any ships within its territory destined for shipbreaking in non-Annex VII States, and Annex VII flag states must do all they can to legally prohibit the transboundary movement of such ships. If any intention to dispose has been formed prior to departure from any Annex VII port state, the departure should be banned, and the moment any intention has been formed, Annex VII flag states must likewise prohibit the movement of the ship. Finally, those Annex VII states that have jurisdiction over, persons, including corporations, owners, charterers, brokers, shipping agents, captains and crew, to prevent/prohibit the export to non-Annex VII states also must take action to prohibit the ship-as-hazardous-waste from moving to a non-Annex VII country.

III. Other Outstanding Issues

1. We take exception to the argument made by industry on certain occasions, that a ship cannot be a ship and a hazardous waste at the same time, while the ship can sail under its own power. The Basel Convention defines “hazardous wastes” as those “[w]astes that belong to any category contained in Annex I, unless they do not possess any of the characteristics contained in Annex III….”. The Convention does not hinge its definition on whether the waste is capable of operating under its own power or is incapable of any type of functionality or ability to float, operate etc., nor does the Convention exempt a waste based on its possible subsequent economic reutilization. Interpretations that attempt to include these non-existent criteria are without foundation.

2. We also take exception to the argument that if the hazardous waste is in the structure of the ship, the ship itself cannot be considered a hazardous waste, particularly if the hazardous material is a small concentration (by weight) of the total weight of the vessel. Again, the Basel Convention looks at “hazardous waste” whether it belongs to any category contained in Annex I, and whether it possesses any characteristics contained in Annex III. With the notable exception of PCBs (50 ppm) the Convention does not set concentration levels for when a material will or will not exhibit a hazardous characteristic.

The Basel Convention supplies an intelligent definition in this regard, given that some highly toxic substances are disproportionately light in weight or concentration as compared to a ship’s total weight and mass, but are undiminished in their toxicity to humans and the environment, e.g. asbestos, tributyl tin, dioxins etc.

3. Finally, we take note that Art. 1(4) provides that “[w]astes which derive from the normal operation of a ship, the discharge of which is covered by another international instrument, are excluded from the scope of this Convention.” This article does not apply to ships destined for shipbreaking nor to their construction materials and components. Rather it excludes operational discharges such as ballast water releases, oil losses during voyage, etc. because such operational discharges from ships in operation are covered by the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), an International Maritime Organization legal regime.

Submitted by the Basel Action Network (BAN) and Greenpeace International for the 4th Session of the Legal Working Group of the Basel Convention.
10 January 2002

13 March 2001

Health Risks Pre-eminent as WTO Upholds French Asbestos Ban:


In a landmark verdict, the WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) ruled on Monday 12 March that France was justified in banning imports of goods containing white asbestos, rejecting a Canadian request to have a September 2000 WTO panel finding overturned (see BRIDGES Weekly, 19 September 2000). The AB upheld the panel’s key finding that the French ban was justified under Article XX(b) of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) — which provides a general exception to WTO rules for measures considered necessary to protect human health. Most significantly, the AB reversed the panel’s conclusion that asbestos and other, less dangerous alternative fibres are “like” products as defined by Article III:4 of GATT and should in principle be accorded the same treatment on the French market. The panel — which issued its ruling last September — came to the above-mentioned conclusion while it considered that it was “not appropriate” to take into account the health risks associated with white, or chrysotile, asbestos when examining the “likeness” of the product with alternatives such as polyvinyl alcohol, cellulose and glass (PCG) fibres (for more details, see the panel’s report, WT/DS135/R, available on the WTO website).

By contrast, the Appellate Body report stated, “We are very much of the view that evidence related to the health risks associated with a product may be pertinent in an examination of the ‘likeness’ under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.” (Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS135/AB/R, §113). The “carcinogenicity, or toxicity, constitutes, as we see it, a defining aspect of the physical properties of chrysotile asbestos fibres. The evidence indicates that PCG fibres, in contrast, do not share these properties, at least to the same extent. We do not see how this highly significant physical difference cannot be a consideration in examining the physical properties of a product as part of a determination of ‘likeness’ under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. ” (Ibid. §114).

The AB’s findings were welcomed as a “landmark” ruling by the European Commission, which defended the French ban before the WTO. ” This ruling shows that the WTO is responsive to our citizens’ concerns, ” said EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy. Environmental and consumer organisations are expected to widely welcome the ruling; while the initial panel ruling represented the first time a WTO panel upheld arguments put forward by a defending party to safeguard public health, the “like product” aspect had spurred environmental groups to decry the WTO decision as ‘doing the right thing for the wrong reasons’ and setting a dangerous precedent for failing to distinguish between toxic and non- toxic products.

The Appellate Body did uphold a Canadian challenge to the panel’s finding that the French ban did not constitute a ” technical regulation ” and therefore was not covered by the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). Legal experts said the Appellate Body’s finding was important as it closes a potential loophole allowing any government to declare a measure exempt from the TBT Agreement’s disciplines on the grounds that the measure is deemed necessary for the protection of human health.

The case had a strong political dimension in Canada, the world’s third largest producer of asbestos, because the troubled industry is centred in Quebec where separatist sentiments remain strong — a fact that some analysts say had led the government in Ottawa to take a high-profile stance in the asbestos manufacturers’ defence.

Canadian asbestos producers also warned that the ruling could have significant negative repercussions for developing countries. The ruling gave more weight to arguments of affluent countries that asbestos is dangerous, to the detriment of developing countries, where products made of asbestos-cement help to reduce mortality rates, Denis Hamel, Director of the Asbestos Institute, said on 12 March.

A coalition of non-governmental groups including Greenpeace International, World Wide Fund for Nature International, BAN Asbestos Network, International Ban Asbestos Secretariat, and the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD) will shortly release a statement on the Asbestos decision that will be posted at:http://www.field.org.uk.

“WTO Appellate Body Upholds French Ban on Asbestos Imports,” BNA, 13 March 2001; “WTO upholds France’s ban on asbestos,” PLANET ARK, 13 March 2001; “Landmark ruling backs French ban on asbestos,” FINACIAL TIMES, 12 March 2001; “WTO upholds France’s ban on asbestos,” REUTERS, 12 March 2001; ICTSD Internal Files.
                               
Source: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). 13 March 2001

13 February 2001

NGOs Submit AMICUS Brief to WTO Appellate Body on Asbestos:


A coalition of environmental and health NGOs has filed an amicus curiae (’friend of the court’) submission to the WTO Appellate Body (AB) in the dispute between Canada and the EU regarding the French ban on the import of asbestos (see BRIDGES Weekly, 19 September 2001). The submission is the second attempt by the coalition to have its views heard in the proceedings after the AB refused their first request for leave to file a written submission in November last year, arguing that the submission did not comply with the specified requirements (see BRIDGES Weekly, 28 November 2001).

In a statement accompanying the submission, the NGOs — which include the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD) on behalf of Ban Asbestos (International and Virtual) Network, Greenpeace International, International Ban Asbestos Secretariat, and World Wide Fund for Nature (International) — stated their continued belief that they met each requirement and accordingly took this opportunity “to demonstrate in full, with the enclosed brief, what we were unable to demonstrate to the Appellate Body’s satisfaction in the Application for Leave”. They furthermore outlined the reasons why the second submission was “pertinent and useful” and should therefore be accepted by the AB. In the submission itself, the NGOs supported the decision of the AB which upheld the French ban as compatible with WTO rules, but also stated that the “Panel made certain errors of law in its application of customary rules of treaty interpretation of public international law under the Vienna Convention.” The submission is available online at:http://www.field.org.uk/papers/tepap.htm.

ICTSD Internal Files

Source: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). 13 February 2001